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The Twentieth-Century Revolution in
Family Wealth Transmission
John H. Langbein*
Over the last century or so, as a result of the vast
technological forces that have transformed the way
we produce goods and services, there has been a fun-
damental change in the very nature of wealth.
Whereas wealth used to take the form mainly of tan-
gibles (that is, realty, plant and equipment, inven-
tory, and personal artifacts), wealth in advanced
technological countries such as the United States is
mostly intangible.
I shall be concerned in this article with private-
sector wealth.I Into the eighteenth century, land was
the dominant form of wealth, but no longer.' The
technological forces that broke up older, family-
centered modes of economic organization called
forth two new forms of private-sector wealth. One
category is what we today callfinancial assets-that is,
stocks, bonds, bank deposits, mutual fund shares,
insurance contracts, and the like. The other great
form of modern wealth is what the economists call
human capital. It is the skills and knowledge that lie at
the root of advanced technological life.
*Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law, Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School. This article is based on the Joseph
Trachtman Lecture, originally presented to the American Col-
lege of Probate Counsel in February, 1988. The speech text
appears in 14 Probate Lawyer 1 (1988). A shorter version of the
lecture was published in 87 Michigan Law Review 722 (1988).
The research assistance of Kim Pierce and Nir Yarden and the
suggestions of Walter Blum, Joel Dobris, Richard Epstein,
Daniel Ernst, Lawrence Friedman, and Mary Ann Glendon are
gratefully acknowledged.
1. More than twenty years ago in a notable law review article,
Charles Reich called attention to one species of "new property"
-claims to government largess, especially those we have come
to call entitlement programs, such as Social Security and Medi-
care. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964). Reich's
"new property" will not much concern me in this article,
because these entitlements lie mostly outside family dominion.
You can neither give nor sell nor bequeath your Social Security
claims.
2. Data from Bucks County, Pennsylvania, indicates that
realty constituted more than half the wealth in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century probated estates. C. Shammas, M. Salmon
& M. Dahlin, Inheritance in America from Colonial Times to
the Present 19 (1987) [hereinafter cited as Inheritance in
America]. For data evidencing a spectacular decline from colo-
nial to modern times in the percentage of testators transmitting
farms and firms, see id. at 106, 191.
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The main purpose of this article is to sound a pair
of themes about the way in which these great changes
in the nature of wealth have become associated with
changes of perhaps comparable magnitude in the
timing and in the character of family wealth
transmission.
My first theme concerns human capital. Whereas
of old, wealth transmission from parents to children
tended to center on major items of patrimony such
as the family farm or the family firm, today for the
broad middle classes, wealth transmission centers on
a radically different kind of asset: the investment in
skills, human capital. In consequence, intergenera-
tional wealth transmission no longer occurs primar-
ily upon the death of the parents, but rather, when
the children are growing up, hence, during the par-
ents' lifetimes.
My second theme, which concerns financial
assets, arises from the awesome demographic trans-
formation of modern life. For reasons that I shall
explore, those same parents who now make their
main wealth transfer to their children inter vivos are
also living much longer. The need to provide for the
parents in their lengthy old age has put a huge new
claim on family wealth, a claim that necessarily
reduces the residuum that would otherwise have
passed to survivors. A new institution has arisen to
help channel the process of saving and dissaving for
old age: the private pension fund. I The private pension
system depends almost entirely on that new property
in the instruments of financial intermediation. I
shall emphasize a distinctive attribute of pension
wealth, namely, the bias toward annuitization.
When wealth is annuitized, virtually nothing is left
for transfer on death.
At the outset, I must emphasize a pair of major
exclusions from the trends that I shall be describing.
For the most part, I shall be talking about the pat-
terns of wealth transmission that characterize the
broad generality of American wealth holders-
roughly, the upper third to upper half of the popu-
lace. I mean, in short, the middle and especially the
3. To be sure, the business of providing retirement income,
both in money and in the form of medical services, is the proto-
typical government transfer scheme. Social Security benefits
epitomize Charles Reich's new property. Reich, supra note 1, at
734. But for propertied people, Social Security has always been
something of a sideshow, and the recent revisions of the system
that have begun to tax the benefits received by comparatively
affluent distributees confirm that people of means will in the
future have even less to expect from Social Security.
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upper-middle classes, which is to say, the mostly
white-collar, technical, managerial, and professional
cohort-the people who propel the knowledge-based
economy of our post-industrial age, and who com-
mand much of its wealth.4 The trends I shall be dis-
cussing have had less influence on the wealth
transmission practices at the extremes of our society
-among the very rich and among the poor.
I. PROLOGUE: FAMILY WEALTH THEN AND Now
It is often the case that the best way to broach the
subject of the new is to identify the important char-
acteristics of the old. Accordingly, I want to begin by
flipping the calendar backward a century and more,
to the days when Abraham Lincoln lived on the
American prairie and when his contemporaries were
building the cities of the Atlantic seaboard, the Great
Lakes, and the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys. We
want to remind ourselves of some central traits of
wealth holding and wealth transmission in this
period.
A. The Nineteenth Century
The family was prototypically a unit of produc-
tion. Nineteenth-century America was overwhelm-
ingly a nation of small farms. In the towns and cities,
the predominant economic entities were small-firm
producers and small shops. Farmers, artisans, and
shopkeepers had in common the tradition that the
entire family worked in the enterprise. In those cir-
cumstances, contemporaries had little occasion to
distinguish between what we think of as earned
income (income from one's labor) and investment
income (the return to property). The two income
streams were merged in a single endeavor. Both the
generation of the parents and the generation of the
children looked to the farm or the firm for their live-
lihood, with scant attention to idle accounting ques-
tions about how much of their income to apportion
to labor and how much to property.
In emphasizing that the returns to labor and capi-
tal were composite, I do not mean that the property
component was unimportant. Property was desper-
ately important. Ownership of a farm or a firm res-
cued you from a mean life of stoop labor in someone
else's field, mill, or household. In former times, it
4. See text at notes 35-6 infra for discussion of sector wealth
data and its interpretation.
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was vastly harder to live by your skills alone, without
patrimony. Accordingly, people of means aspired to
nothing so much as to leave their children similarly
advantaged. You hoped to transmit the farm or the
firm, and thus in the quaint phrase of the time, to
make for your children "a provision in life."
There was little or no formal education. This was
a low-tech age, and the transmission of skills, like so
much else, could still occur within the family. You
learned your trade alongside your parents and your
relations, in the fields, in the firm, or at the hearth.
Put differently, the family was not only the primary
unit of production, it was the primary educational
entity as well. Only a few crafts and learned profes-
sions required external education; and even in those
pursuits, education was frequently assimilated to a
domestic model through the apprenticeship system
of training.
Succession to ownership rights in this multi-
generational enterprise occurred at death-that is,
the death of the parents, typically of the father. The
tendency both in intestacy and for testate estates
was to limit the widow to a life interest, in order to
assure continuity of the enterprise in the hands of
the next generation, whose members had already
been long employed in the enterprise. Succession to
the family farm or family firm typically occurred on
the father's death. There was no reason for him to
surrender dominion over the family patrimony inter
vivos. Ownership until death reinforced parental
control over the extended family and over its col-
lective enterprise. Remember that, although wealth
transmission occurred at death, life expectancies
were shorter. The successors were typically young
adults, as compared to the middle-aged children
who typically succeed when parents die in modern
circumstances.
Finally, to complete this little snapshot of impor-
tant traits of nineteenth-century wealth transmission
patterns, I wish to say something about the dimin-
ished expectations of daughters. Perhaps the easy
way to make this point is to remind you how often
you have come across some family firm from earlier
decades in which the father associated the son or
sons in the firm's name-for example, Steinway &
Sons; but you have not seen firms called Steinway &
Daughters. Although there were many exceptions,
the wealth transmission process tended to favor the
male line. The farm or the firm had to be worked.
Except when a family had only a daughter or daugh-
4
ters, continuity within the patrimony emphasized
the son.'
B. Contemporary Family Property Relations
In the late twentieth century, the family has in
general ceased to be an important unit of produc-
tion. To be sure, you can still find dribbles of cottage
industry in America, and there is still a fair amount
of Mom-and-Pop retailing, but in the main the pro-
duction and sale of goods and services has forever left
the home. The technological sophistication and mar-
keting complexity of modern modes of production
and distribution impose enormous capital require-
ments. Village blacksmiths cannot manufacture
automobiles, airplanes, and oil rigs. The village
entrepreneur can still sell a screwdriver or make a
hamburger, but the evidence is overwhelming that
the customer mostly prefers to patronize K-Mart or
McDonald's. Thus, the characteristic unit of pro-
duction in our age is corporate rather than domestic.
It is the share company.
These trends extend to farming as well. American
agriculture is ever more technology-driven and capi-
tal intensive. It has become a byword that we live in
an era of corporate agriculture. Family farms still
exist in America, indeed, in some farming areas it
would be fair to say that family farms remain charac-
teristic. But a large fraction of them are hobby
farms, secondary enterprises conducted by people
whose main livelihood derives from employment
outside the home. As farms have grown in size and
productivity, an astonishing agricultural depopul-
ation has occurred. In what used to be a nation of
farmers, we are now fed by a mere 5 percent of the
population, down from 44 percent in 1880,6 and it
should be remembered that these people are not only
feeding the rest of us, they are running our largest
export industry as well.
5. In emphasizing this reason for preferring the male line, I
do not wish to imply that it was the sole factor. Conceptions that
we now find archaic about the needs and roles of women were
also involved. But it is instructive to see that in Inheritance in
America, supra note 2 (which is fully informed by modern femi-
nist sensibilities), the authors point out that by the end of the
nineteenth century, when the transmission of family enterprise
had become markedly less common (id. at 106), the treatment of
sons and daughters in the authors' Bucks County, Pennsylva-
nia, sample became "nearly identical." Id. at 108.
6. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to
1970, series Kl-16, at 457 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Historical
Statistics].
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Thus, in the main, we neither farm nor manufac-
ture at home. The family has undergone a special-
ization of function. In economic terms, the family
remains a unit of consumption but no longer a unit
of production. Enterprise is organized outside the
home, and the worker now leaves the home for his
employment. Such a worker contributes his labor to
his employment, but he no longer supplies the plant
and equipment as he did in the bygone day of the
family enterprise. The reason that most workers use
external capital is, of course, closely connected to the
technological and marketing forces that have magni-
fied the size and complexity of the productive proc-
esses, the forces that drove the worker out of the
home in the first place. Modern modes of enterprise
are capital intensive. The blacksmith could afford his
anvil, but we cannot expect the autoworker to supply
his factory or the airplane pilot to bring along his
own Boeing 747.
The ever-larger capital requirements of techno-
logically advanced enterprise required modes of
financing that exceeded the capabilities of the family.
Ownership of a small firm or a small farm could lie
within the scope of family-based capital accumula-
tion and capital transmission, but we understand
why IBM, General Electric, and AT&T cannot be
family firms.' The corporate form arose to facilitate
the pooling and allocation of capital, as did the spe-
cialized institutions of finance. In the late twentieth
century we recognize three dominant modes of
financial intermediation: first, the corporation, and
with it, the securities industry that makes the market
in corporate shares and corporate debt; second,
banking-commercial, investment, and savings and
loan; and third, the insurance industry. All three
were primitive in antebellum America.8 Not only
7. See Daniel Bell's remarks about the "breakup of family
capitalism" at the end of the nineteenth century, when bankers
and later corporate managers gained control of large enter-
prises. D. Bell, The End of Ideology 40-42 (1960).
8. See R. Seavoy, The Origins of the American Business Cor-
poration: 1784-1855, at 3-7, 191-223 (1982) (spread of
industry-specific general incorporation statutes in New York in
the 1840s and 1850s). The marketability of corporate shares
increased significantly from the 1890s. See Navin & Sears, The
Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities: 1887-1902, 29 Busi-
ness Hist. Rev. 105 (1955). For an overview of the history of
American banking, see Green, "Financial Intermediaries," in 2
Encyclopedia of American Economic History 707 (G. Porter,
ed. 1980). A recent study of the history of the life insurance
industry is V. Zelizer, Morals and Manners: The Development
of Life Insurance in the United States (1979).
6
have these financial intermediaries now displaced
the family's role as the unit of capital accumulation,
they have also created the new forms of wealth in
financial assets-the various securities, depositary
claims, and other contract rights.
These instruments of financial intermediation
now absorb the savings that the family previously
devoted to the family enterprise. Because family
wealth is no longer retained but rather invested
externally, it now takes the form of claims on outside
enterprises. This new property, paper property, has
become the characteristic form of transmissible
wealth. It is the stuff of the financial pages. As
Roscoe Pound said in an arresting dictum that I
never tire of quoting, "Wealth, in a commercial age,
is made up largely of promises." I shall have more
to say about how the rise of the new property in
financial assets has come to figure in the new pat-
terns of family wealth transmission. For the
moment, however, I want to direct attention to that
other species of new property that is associated with
the break-up of the family as a unit of production:
human capital.
II. HUMAN CAPITAL
The same underlying technological and economic
forces that caused the dissolution of family-based
enterprise have also stripped the family of much of
its role as an educational institution. This develop-
ment, which is in a sense quite obvious to us a11, has
had enormous implications for family wealth trans-
mission, implications that have not been adequately
appreciated.
It is a truism that a technological age requires a
technologically proficient workforce. The awesome
expansion of human knowledge over the past cen-
tury and more has made the family obsolete as a
repository and transfer agent for this huge range of
knowledge. The educational demands of modern
economic life have become immense, and so has the
cost of providing children with this educational
endowment.
A central thesis of this article is that paying for this
education has become the characteristic mode of
intergenerational wealth transmission for most
American families.
9. R. Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 236
(1922).
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A. Educational Expenditure
Let us look at the statistics in order to get a sense
of the underlying magnitudes. Total expenditures for
formal education in the United States in 1840 have
been calculated at $9.2 million. This sum increased
over the nineteenth century, a period of relatively
low inflation, to stand at $289.6 million in 1900.10 By
1959 the figure had reached $23.8 billion, which
amounted to 4.8 percent of gross national product."
Less than thirty years later, in the 1986-1987 aca-
demic year, the total expenditure on formal educa-
tion stood at $282.1 billion, a figure that represented
7 percent of gross national product. Sixty percent of
this money went to fund primary and secondary
education, 40 percent went to higher education. 12
While the official educational statistics are valu-
able for conveying a general sense of the magni-
tudes, they conceal many subtle issues of definition
and measurement. Many sins pass under the label of
education. Not every course in basketweaving
deserves to be reckoned as investment in human cap-
ital. On the other hand, much of our financial
investment in our children takes forms that, some-
what arbitrarily, fall outside the category of formal
education. If you take your children to a nature pre-
serve or on a tour of French cathedrals, that's private
recreation, whereas when some educational institu-
tion takes your kid square dancing, that's education.
Indeed, as my colleagues Walter Blum and the late
Harry Kalven pointed out in a celebrated book some
thirty years ago, the most important inheritance of
all-the thing that decisively advantages middle
class children-is the cultural bequest from their
parents. " That parental transfer of language, of val-
ues, and of psychological well-being sets the stage for
all the formal learning and achievements of later
years. None of that gets captured in the educational
statistics. Nevertheless, once due allowance is made
for the shortcomings of what the statisticians deem to
be education, the numbers that I have been report-
ing are so enormous that they bespeak an enterprise
of daunting importance.
10. Fishlow, 26 J. Econ. Hist. 418, 420 (1966); see id. at 431
for inflation adjusted figures in 1958 dollars.
11. Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Sta-
tistics 1987, at 24 (1987) [hereinafter cited as Education Digest].
12. Id. at 4, 25.
13. W. Blum & H. Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation 88 (1953).
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In 1870, 2 percent of the population was graduat-
ing from high school; by 1970 the figure was 75.6
percent. 14 In 1870 institutions of higher learning in
the United States conferred a total of 9,372 degrees,
of which 9,371 were bachelors' degrees and exactly
one was a doctorate. In 1970 the total number of
degrees conferred showed an increase of more than a
hundred fold over 1870. The figure stood at
1,065,000, of which almost thirty thousand were
Ph.D or equivalent degrees. College enrollments as
a percentage of the college age population reached
12.5 percent in 1946, 29.6 percent in 1970, and 31.3
percent in 1985.'1 As recently as 1940, only 4.6 per-
cent of the American population had completed four
or more years of university study. By 1985, almost 20
percent (19.4 percent, to be precise) had done so.
Economists who have examined this gigantic edu-
cation industry have increasingly been of the view
that expenditures on education ought not to be
viewed as a simple consumption expense, like money
spent on corn flakes or handkerchiefs.' 6 Rather, they
see educational expenditure as an investment,
closely akin to conventional investment in plant,
equipment, and inventory. Education produces
skills, and skills are as much an input in the produc-
tive process as machines. Economists now routinely
liken these skills to capital, the species of capital that
they call human capital. Modern productive proc-
esses are skill-driven. Whether we speak of new
fields such as aeronautics or ancient ones such as
health care, the story is the same. While plant and
equipment become increasingly sophisticated-
robotics and computers and CAT scanners and all
that-the skills of the workforce become still more
decisive. Human capital thus substitutes for nonhu-
man capital. Skill embodies knowledge, and new
knowledge not only displaces old knowledge, it dis-
places plant and equipment as well. Think of the
advance in medical science that made polio a pre-
ventable disease and consigned the iron lung indus-
try to the scrapheap. Skill displaced machines.
Human capital, being literally embodied in mor-
tals, is distinguished from physical capital by the
14. Historical Statistics, supra note 6, series 598-601, at 379.
15. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States, Table 192, at 118 (1987).
16. See, e.g. Campbell & Siegel, The Demand for Higher
Education in the United States: 1919-1964, 57 Amer. Econ.
Rev. 482 (1967).
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frailty of the human condition. Human capital dies
with the holder and thus needs to be created afresh in
each generation. Of course, the highly transitory
quality of human capital is really more a difference
of degree than of kind. Machines and structures also
fall apart or become obsolete, which is why we sys-
tematically account for the artifacts of physical capi-
tal by means of depreciation schedules.
Careful econometric study has documented that
human capital has steadily increased over the twenti-
eth century as a fraction of total capital and as a frac-
tion of gross national product. The percent of GNP
spent on both education and on job training grew by
80 percent from 1929 to 1969, in which year it stood
at 15.4 percent of GNPII A recent set of calculations
"implies that education costs society approximately
as much as investment in nonresidential physical
capital." 18
There is no mystery about who has been paying
the bill for this vast expansion of education. The
main burden falls upon the parents. Indeed, even
childless people pay substantial sums in taxes to sup-
port the public educational establishment. But for
present purposes, I want to focus on propertied fami-
lies who are raising children.
My thesis is quite simple, and, I hope, quite intui-
tive. I believe that, in striking contrast to the patterns
of last century and before, in modern times the busi-
ness of educating children has become the main
occasion for intergenerational wealth transfer. Of
old, parents were mainly concerned to transmit the
patrimony-prototypically the farm or the firm, but
more generally, that "provision in life" that rescued
children from the harsh fate of being a mere laborer.
In today's economic order, it is education more than
property, the new human capital rather than the old
physical capital, that similarly advantages a child.
We know that income levels correlate powerfully
with education. In 1985 the median annual income
of full-time male workers aged twenty-five and over
who had completed some years of high school but
had not graduated was under $20,000; for those who
had completed four years of college the figure was
above $30,000; and for those with more than four
years of college, the figure approached $40,000. The
17. John W. Kendrik, The Formation of Total Capital 66
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1976).
18. Johnson, Investment in and Returns from Education, in
The Level and Composition of Household Saving (P. Hen-
dershott, ed., 1985).
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comparable earnings figures for female workers were
lower, but differences in educational attainment
among women produced similar disparities in favor
of the well-educated. 19
Family wealth and its corollary, family income,
are crucial determinants of access to education. A
sociologist of education recently summed up the
data in the following way: "The amount of schooling
that individuals obtain and their school continuation
decisions are strongly affected by characteristics of
their families. Persons whose parents have more
schooling, higher income and better jobs; whose
families are smaller; and who were raised in urban
areas typically obtain more schooling than persons
from less advantaged backgrounds." 20
The process of delivering educational advantage
to children begins when they are very young. There
has been a huge increase in formal preschool educa-
tion in recent decades. In the years of primary and
secondary education, propertied parents strive to
locate in suitable school districts, or to send their
children to private schools. By the way, the distinc-
tion between private and public schools is far less
meaningful than might appear at first glance. Many
of those distinguished suburban school districts that
represent the high-water mark of quality in our pub-
lic school tradition are in truth better understood as
private schools with tax-deductible tuition-the tui-
tion taking the form of relatively high real estate
taxes that are deductible against income taxes. Par-
ents tend to move into these school districts when
they have school-age children, and to move out when
they no longer need the schools.
And then there is college. The federal govern-
ment's Digest of Education Statistics 1987 reports that
the average annual charge for tuition, room, and
board for undergraduates in the 1985-1986 aca-
demic year was $3,640 at public colleges and $8,870
at private colleges. Because these numbers are aver-
ages, which lump low-cost local institutions with elite
schools, they understate the bills that parents face
19. Education Digest, supra note 11, at 4, 12. The Wall Street
journal reported data indicating much wider income disparities
across the categories of educational attainment. Average
monthly income for a person with only a high-school diploma is
shown as $415; a vocational degree, $990; a bachelor's degree,
$1,540; a doctoral degree, $2,747; and a professional degree,
$3,439. Wall St. J. 21, col. 3 (March 17, 1988).
20. Mare, Trends in Schooling: Demography, Performance,
and Organization, 453 Annals 96, 101 (1981).
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when they send children to the major universities. At
the premier private universities, the bill for tuition,
room, and board now exceeds $15,000 a year; travel
and incidentals can easily bring the figure to
$20,000. In the graduate and professional schools,
the price tag is higher still. This year, most of the
major private law schools are charging above
$14,000 in tuition alone. Tuition, fees, books, and
supplies at the University of Chicago Law School
this academic year are estimated to cost $14,445. At
Chicago, we project total annual expenses for an
unmarried law student at more than $24,000 per
year, which puts the effective pricetag of a three-year
Chicago degree near $75,000. By the way, it costs us
a further $40,000 to deliver that degree to the stu-
dent, money that comes from endowment income, a
trickle of foundation and government grants, and a
torrent of alumni support.
A story in Newsweek in May of 1987 supplied fig-
ures on the annual cost of undergraduate education
at Johns Hopkins. The $15,410 that Hopkins
charged in 1987 for tuition, room, and board consti-
tuted 31 percent of a family income of $50,000 per
year. By contrast, the $2,000 that Hopkins charged
in 1960 represented only 15 percent of the inflation-
adjusted equivalent family income for 1960, which
was $13,500.21
Now it is quite obvious that very few families can
afford to pay 31 percent of family income, or any-
thing near it, on what we would call-in an account-
ing sense-a current basis. That is especially true
when the family has more than one child in the edu-
cational mill at the same time. For most families,
therefore, these education expenses represent capital
transfers in a quite literal sense: The money comes
from savings, that is, from the family's capital; or
debt is assumed, meaning that the money is bor-
rowed from the family's future capital.
The guidelines that the universities use for calcu-
lating financial aid are quite explicit about taking
into account all family wealth, not just current
income, in deciding what fraction of the education
bill the family should be made to pay. At the law
school level for example, we are served by an organi-
zation called the Graduate and Professional School
Financial Aid Service, known under its repulsive
acronym of GAPSFAS, which analyzes the family
21. Fuming over College Costs, Newsweek 66 (May 18,
1987).
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financial statements of applicants. GAPSFAS guide-
lines treat as available for defraying educational
expenses not only the family's liquid assets, but also
the family's home equity and the net worth of any
family farm or family business. GAPSFAS publishes
tables that indicate what percentage of home equity
or of business or farm net worth should be utilized
before the student qualifies for financial aid. These
tables resemble the progressive bracket tables in the
Internal Revenue Code: the greater the family
wealth, the higher the fraction that the parents are
expected to transfer to the child in support of the
child's education.22
B. Education Displaces Inheritance
The same Newsweek article that discussed the
education cost figures from Hopkins recounted
the saga of a parent named C.Y. Lu, who had the
financial misfortune to have one son attending
Princeton while the other was at the Harvard Law
School. Mr. Lu is reported to have sold off invest-
ments, taken out educational loans, and refinanced
his home mortgage by $60,000, in order to raise
a total of $140,000. Mr. Lu is quoted as saying,
"I've told my sons, your education is going to be
your inheritance."
There in Mr. Lu's words you see my theme encap-
sulated. Education is displacing inheritance, lifetime
transfers are displacing succession on death. Back in
the nineteenth century or earlier, Mr. Lu would have
husbanded his wealth and left it to his sons at his
death. Today, in mid-life, he cashes out and goes into
debt in order to fork over his savings to Princeton
and Harvard.
Nobody forces Mr. Lu to do this. It was quite open
to him to say to his two sons, "Boys, I'll make you a
deal. I'll buy you out of those admission letters from
Princeton and Harvard. Stay away from those caul-
drons of red ink, and content yourselves with attend-
ing the community college down the road-or better
yet, go right to work in an accessible career like
pumping gas at the corner filling station. Then, I'll
have $140,000 more in family wealth that I can
invest through Merrill Lynch. It will compound and
be available for you on my death." Well, we all know
22. H. Flamer, D. Horch, &J. Bruno, Measuring the Finan-
cial Status of Graduate and Professional Students: GAPFAS
Theory and Computation Procedures 1987-88 Award Year 9,
22-23, 48 (1987).
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that virtually no parent behaves that way. Parents
understand full well the point that the economists
have been demonstrating with their studies of
human capital. Those degrees from Princeton and
Harvard are superior investments when compared
to any class of financial assets, by virtue of a very
conventional test: The degrees produce a far larger
income stream.
Mr. Lu happened to have sons, but if his children
had been daughters, his financial predicament
would scarcely have improved. One of the grand
American social achievements, in which we led the
world, was to extend the opportunity for formal edu-
cation to women. That trend was epitomized in the
nineteenth century with the proliferation of women's
colleges. Today, more women than men now attend
college. Accordingly, the twentieth-century revolu-
tion in family wealth transmission may ultimately
come to be understood as having been even more
consequential for women than for men.
From the proposition that the main parental
wealth transfer to children now takes place inter
vivos, there follows a corollary: Children of proper-
tied parents are much less likely to expect an inherit-
ance. Whereas of old children did expect the transfer
of the farm or the firm, today's children expect help
with educational expenses, and they sometimes
receive help with initial housing and career
expenses, but they do not depend on parental wealth
transfer at death. Lengthened life expectancies mean
that the life spans of the parents overlap the life spans
of their adult children for much longer than used to
be. Parents now live to see their children reaching
peak earnings potential, and those earnings often
exceed what the parents were able to earn. Today,
children are typically middle-aged when the survivor
of their two parents dies, and middle-aged children
are far less likely to be financially needy. It is still the
common practice within middle- and upper-middle
class families for parents to leave to their children (or
grandchildren) most or all of any property that hap-
pens to remain when the parents die, but there is no
longer a widespread sense of parental responsibility
to abstain from consumption in order to transmit an
inheritance. Children no longer expect it, and par-
ents no longer feel the obligation. This notion is epit-
omized by that exuberant bumper sticker that one
sometimes sees on recreational vehicles in the camp-
ing grounds of middle America: "We're spending
our children's inheritance."
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C. Consequences for the Ethos of Inheritance?
At the outset of this article, I cautioned that the
revolution in family wealth transmission would be
seen to be less significant for dynastic wealth hold-
ers, that is, for the very rich. The reason is obvious.
School bills make little dent in large fortunes. There
are intrinsic limits to how much education an indi-
vidual can absorb, and those limits are reached long
before the holders of great wealth would notice.
Nevertheless, there is a deeper sense in which the
forces that have transformed- the patterns of wealth
transmission for the broad middle classes have also
touched the holders of great wealth. The new pattern
has become a social norm, a norm so powerful that it
has begun to chip away at the ethos of older notions
of inheritance.
This is a phenomenon that I first became aware of
as a result of talking with practicing estate planners.
Later, I noticed Fortune magazine running a story on
it. Fortune reported on the thinking of some
extremely wealthy people who planned to leave their
children only token inheritances. The story led off
with the views of Warren Buffett, chairman of the
Berkshire Hathaway holding company, whose per-
sonal wealth is estimated at $1.5 billion. Buffett is
quoted as explaining why he plans to leave each of
his three children only a few hundred thousand dol-
lars. Having put the children through college, Buf-
fett says he expects them "to carve out their own
place in this world...." It would be "harmful" and
"antisocial" to set up his children with "a lifetime
supply of food stamps just because they came out of
the right womb." 23 Buffett's $1.5 billion will go to
charity. So will the fifty-million dollar fortune of a
New York entrepreneur named Eugene Lang, who
sent his three children to college, gave each "a nomi-
nal sum" after college, and plans to disinherit them.
He explained to the Fortune reporter: "To me, inher-
itance dilutes the motivation that most young people
have to fulfill the best that is in them. I want to give
my kids the tremendous satisfaction of making it on
their own."
People like Messrs. Buffett and Lang are quite
exceptional. Most people of great means prefer to
leave most of their wealth to their descendants,
hoping to shape the younger generations so that
the wealth will be used responsibly. The hostility
towards conventional succession expressed by
23. Kirkland, Should You Leave It All to the Children?, For-
tune 18 (Sept. 29, 1986).
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Messrs. Buffett and Lang is noteworthy not
because such hostility is prevalent, but simply
because it would have been inconceivable a century
or more ago. Can you imagine the twelfth Earl of
Carlisle arranging for the dissipation of the family
seat, in order to stimulate the thirteenth Earl to the
challenge of reacquiring it?
Messrs. Buffett and Lang are voicing an attitude
toward conventional wealth transmission that is not
only quite exceptional, it is historically recent and
also very American. Behind it, I think, are two novel
ideas. One is the assumption that wealth is largely
fungible, that there is no great sentimental attach-
ment nor any particular social significance to the
family's existing patrimony. That is why Mr. Buffett
could liken his fortune to a pile of food stamps, and
why Mr. Lang could hope that his children would
experience the satisfaction of "making it on their
own." By it, he means, something like it, but not the
identical property. This notion that wealth is fungi-
ble is an idea that fits the new forms of wealth better
than the old, an idea that fits American circum-
stances better than English or European. You are
much more likely to be sentimental about your
ancestors' manor house than about the family's port-
folio of marketable securities.
Further, the disdain for customary modes of
wealth transfer that Messrs. Buffett and Lang are
voicing presupposes that these gentlemen have
already achieved for their children the characteristic
wealth transfer of modern times, that investment in
human capital through education. More and more,
Americans expect personal wealth to take the form of
earned income, that is, we expect it to be a return on
human capital. Messrs. Buffett and Lang have taken
that expectation to its limit; in their eyes, conven-
tional wealth transfer has lost its legitimacy. The
esteem associated with holding property really now
applies only to earned income, to property that
embodies the fruits of human capital. In this sense,
the revolution in family wealth transmission, which
is overwhelmingly an event of the broad middle
classes, touches even the holders of great wealth.
D. Europe and England: A Comparative Aside
The substitution of human capital for older forms
of property is less evident in the patterns of family
wealth transmission in Europe than in the United
States, even though the underlying technological
and economic forces have been broadly comparable
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on both sides of the Atlantic. The main explanation
surely has to do with differences in educational
finance. As a generality, the Europeans have social-
ized education and educational finance much more
than we.
England represents something of a middle case,
because of the enormous importance of private, pre-
university schooling in the English system. Proper-
tied English families are just as prepared to sacrifice
for Eton or Winchester as Americans are for Stan-
ford or Dartmouth. On the other hand, this kind of
private schooling is unimportant on the Continent;
and both in England and on the Continent, the uni-
versity systems are all but wholly socialized. Tuition
is mostly negligible, and because the state tends to
suppress quality differentials among universities,
students are more likely than in the United States to
live at home and attend the local institutions.
For Europeans, therefore, educational finance is
not the cataclysmic event in family fortunes that it is
for Americans. I do not want to overstate this point.
It is far costlier for a European family to keep a child
at home and in university than to send him out into
the workforce. That is one reason why, there as here,
levels of participation in higher education correlate
strongly with levels of family income. There as here,
education is costly, and paying for it means that less
wealth will be available for other purposes. But in
Europe the intermediation of the state distorts the
process more and makes the phenomenon more dif-
ficult to discern. In Europe more of the wealth trans-
fer becomes a branch of tax economics. Europeans
pay materially higher taxes than Americans, and
these taxes, which subsidize higher education as well
as many other services, necessarily result in lower
marginal incomes and lower accumulations of family
wealth than would otherwise be the case. This is, of
course, a difference of degree rather than of kind,
since most of American education, both preparatory
and university, is publicly opeiated and tax-
subsidized. But as is often the case in matters of eco-
nomics, differences at the margin matter a great
deal. The United States is unique among advanced
countries in the extent to which educational finance
remains privatized, especially the kinds of education
that are most sought-after by the upper-middle
classes. 14
24. See Education Digest, supra note 11, at 120, for percent-
age of American university budgets deriving from tuition
revenue.
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III. THE PENSION REVOLUTION
The other great chapter in the saga of fundamental
change in family wealth transmission being told in
this article concerns the phenomenon of retirement
and the rise of the private pension system. The pen-
sion fund should be thought of as another artifact of
the new forms of wealth that arose in consequence of
the breakup of older family-centered modes of pro-
duction. Neither on the prairie nor in the cities of
Abraham Lincoln's day had anybody ever heard of a
pension fund. Your life expectancy was such that you
were unlikely to need much in the way of retirement
income. If you did chance to outlive your period of
productive labor, you were in general cared for
within the family.
Not only is the need for a retirement income
stream relatively recent, but so too is the mode of
wealth that now supplies it. Pension funds are com-
posed almost entirely of financial assets-the instru-
ments of financial intermediation-that distinctively
modern form of property that was still of peripheral
importance in the last century.
As late as World War II, the private pension sys-
tem was minuscule.25 Today, the assets of nonfederal
pension plans (that is, private plans plus the pension
funds of state and local government employees) total
two trillion dollars.26 As of 1984, pension funds
owned 22.8 percent of United States equities and
about half of all corporate debt.27 For many middle-
and especially upper-middle-class families, pension
wealth is their largest asset. But pension wealth has
special traits that mark it off sharply from traditional
property, especially when we look at it from the
standpoint of family wealth transmission.
A. The Enhancement of Life Expectancy
The way to begin thinking about the pension revo-
lution is to grasp the magnitude of the underlying
demographic phenomena that brought it about. Life
expectancy a hundred years ago was about forty-five
25. W. Greenough & F. King, Pension Plans and Public Pol-
icy 27-67 (1976).
26. "Pension Assets Total Nearly $2 Trillion," 13 BNA Pen-
sion Reporter 1918-19 (November 17, 1986).
27. R. Ippolito, Pensions, Economics and Public Policy
123-24 (1986).
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years. Today, it is seventy-five years and climbing.28
Behind the awesome spurt in life expectancy over
the last century or so is a phenomenon that has been
called "the elimination of premature disease. "29 In a
nutshell, the insight is that diseases belong in two
categories-the infectious or acute diseases that
we have now largely banished from the mortality
tables; and those diseases of old age that appear
to set intrinsic limits on human longevity. Some
researchers think that they see age eighty-five as the
approximate average norm of the human life span.
In 1980 white females were living to within seven
years of that ideal. Three of those seven years of
what is called "average premature death" are
accounted for by violent death-automobile acci-
dents, bathtub falls, and so forth. Thus, from the
medical viewpoint, it is being said that "the task of
eliminating premature death ... has been largely
accomplished."
To understand what modern sanitation and mod-
ern medicine have achieved, it is instructive to con-
sider the case of tuberculosis, which in the year 1840
was the leading cause of death in the United States.
As late as the year 1900, one American in 500 died
from tuberculosis every year. By 1970, mortality from
tuberculosis had decreased by over 99 percent.
Many factors account for this decline in tuberculosis
mortality rates, including pasteurization of milk,
inspection of cattle, improvement in nutrition and in
living conditions, and the quarantine of diseased
persons. "Epidemiologists are fond of pointing out
that about nine-tenths of the present improvement
... occurred before. the discovery of any drugs that
could kill the tuberculosis germ. Streptomycin was
the first such drug, and it was first used in the
late 1940s."
Declines in the mortality rates from other dread
infectious diseases have been as dramatic. "Small-
pox is entirely eliminated. Paralytic polio, diphthe-
ria, tetanus, typhoid ... and whooping cough have
been reduced to negligible levels. Deaths from
measles and from streptococcal infections have
been eliminated, even though the diseases them-
selves still occur."
28. Dychtwald, The Aging of America: Overview, in Wellness
and Health Promotion for the Elderly 1 (K. Dychtwald ed.
1986).
29. J. Fries & L. Crapo, The Elimination of Premature Dis-
ease, in The Aging of America, supra note 28, at 19.
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Against the power of penicillin syphilis can no
longer kill. "All these conditions have declined over
99 percent, and in some cases, 100 percent." For
pneumonia and influenza, "the reduction has been
only 85 percent. However, this statistic hides an
equally dramatic result. Pneumonia and influenza
deaths now occur almost exclusively among infirm,
very old, or already ill individuals. Such deaths,
which are attributed to a germ, in fact result from
diminished defense mechanisms and lost organ
reserve. Deaths from these conditions in otherwise
healthy individuals in the early and middle years of
life have declined by the same 99 percent as the other
infectious diseases."
Needless to say, part of what makes the AIDS epi-
demic so haunting is that it has happened against
this background of utter triumph over earlier forms
of infectious disease. What we cannot yet know is
whether AIDS will remain an exception in a world
where other infectious diseases remain insignificant;
or whether the elimination of the ancient infectious
diseases has set the stage for the development of new
ones that, like AIDS, are resistant to the environ-
mental measures and to the antibiotics that van-
quished the old ones.
Roughly three of every four deaths in the United
States today stem from three causes: cardiovascular
disease, cancer, and automobile accidents. The
prominence of cardiovascular disease and cancer as
killers is related to the elimination of infectious dis-
eases. "Survival from the diseases that used to kill
early in life allowed the diseases that occur in later
life to increase in frequency as a cause of death."
I have traveled (I hope not detoured) into this
demographic data, because I think that without it
one cannot really grasp what the pension revolution
is all about. The pension fund is a direct response to
the new demographics, in the setting of the new
property. That point is best made if we return for a
moment to our baseline in antebellum America, in
order to see how the phenomenon of aging tran-
spired when family wealth relations centered on the
common patrimony in farm or firm.
Why were there no pension funds? The most
important explanation is that, on account of the
lower life expectancy of the times, far fewer people
outlived their period of productive employment. You
were, so to speak, much more likely to die with your
boots on. I do not want to exaggerate this point. The
forty-five year life expectancy that prevailed a cen-
20
tury ago is a composite figure, greatly distorted by
infant mortality. As late as 1907, "1 of 7 newborns
died in their first year of life, whereas in 1977, 1 of 67
died then; between the ages of one and four, I in
about 17 of those born in 1907 died, whereas 1 in
about 360 died among those born in 1977-
representing a 21-fold reduction." 0
Your chances of surviving to a reasonable age were
much enhanced in the last century once you had
navigated the shoals of infancy. A white male who
lived to age 20 in the year 1900 had an ultimate life
expectancy of 62.2 years; a white female aged 20 in
1900 had a life expectancy of 63.8 years; in 1980 the
projected life expectancy for whites aged 20 was 72.7
years for the male, a gain of 10.5 years; and 79.7 for
the female, a gain of 15.9 years.3 The comparable
figures for nonwhites are lower, but the rate of
improvement across the twentieth century has been
better, especially for women. Thus, we see that even
after we correct for infant mortality, the diminished
life expectancy of the last century was marked
enough to explain why contemporaries so seldom
had occasion to talk about what we call the retire-
ment income problem. If you chanced to outlive
your productive years, you did not in general do so
for very long.
But what of the relative handful who did need
retirement support? The well-known pattern was
one of reverse transfer. Within the family, the chil-
dren, now mature, would support superannuated
parents. For propertied persons, however, this image
of reverse transfer conceals an important point. In
the age of family-centered economic organization,
the parents still owned the farm or the firm. In a
sense that defies accounting precision but that is
nevertheless worth emphasizing, when the elders
received support from the children, they were living
from their capital in the family enterprise-that
enterprise to which the children would succeed when
the elders died.
Now return to the late twentieth century to see
what has changed. Not only have the demographics
altered so that the elders are routinely surviving for
long intervals beyond their years of employment, but
in consequence of the transformation in the nature
of wealth, their property has taken on a radically
30. Urquhart & Heilmann, Risk Watch: The Odds of Life 6
(1984).
31. Inheritance in America, supra note 2, at 149.
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altered character. That family farm or family firm
that was the source of intrafamilial support in former
times has become ever more exceptional. Most
parental wealth (apart from the parents' own human
capital) now takes the form of financial assets, that
is, claims upon and investments in those large-scale
enterprises that have replaced family enterprise.
B. Pension Wealth
In propertied families, today's elderly no longer
expect much financial support from their children.
The shared patrimony in farm or firm that underlay
that reverse transfer system in olden times has now
largely vanished. Instead, people of means are
expected to foresee the need for retirement income
while they are still in the workforce, and to conduct a
program of saving for their retirement. Typically,
these people have already undertaken one great cycle
of saving and dissaving in their lives-that program
by which they effected the investment in human cap-
ital for their children. Just as that former program of
saving was oriented toward a distinctively modern
form of wealth, human capital, so this second pro-
gram centers on the other characteristic form of
twentieth-century wealth, financial assets.
A priori, we might expect that individuals would
be left to save for retirement without government
guidance, much as they are left alone to save and
spend for other purposes, but that has not been the
case. Instead, the federal government has intervened
by creating irresistible tax incentives to encourage
people to conduct much or most of their retirement
saving in a special mode, the tax-qualified pension
plan.
There are three crucial advantages to conducting
retirement saving through a tax-qualified pension
plan. First, most contributions to the plan are tax-
deferred. When my employer contributes to a quali-
fied pension or profit-sharing plan on my behalf, or
when I contribute to a defined contribution plan
such as a 401(k) or, in the case of academic person-
nel, a 403(b), I am saving with pretax dollars. If I am
in the 25 percent bracket, the Treasury is contribut-
ing to my pension savings plan 25 cents in forgone
taxation for my 75 cents in forgone consumption.
The second great tax advantage is that the earn-
ings on qualified plan investments accrue and com-
pound on a tax-deferred basis. It is not until the
employee retires and begins to receive distributions
of his pension savings that he pays income tax on the
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sums distributed. The third major advantage asso-
ciated with pension taxation is that, because most
retirees have lower taxable income in their retire-
ment years than in their peak earning years, they
find that distributions from pension accounts are
usually taxed at lower marginal rates. As the pro-
gressivity of the income tax has abated in recent
years, however, this attribute of the system has
become less significant.
I think that, as a matter of tax policy, it is open to
serious question whether Congress should be grant-
ing the level of tax subsidy for pension saving that it
now does,32 but that is a topic for another day. My
present point is that the tax attractions of conducting
retirement saving through the medium of a tax-
qualified pension plan are simply overwhelming.
These advantages explain why employers incur the
regulatory costs incident to sponsoring these plans;
and why employees, especially those in higher tax
brackets, 33 prefer to take compensation in the form
of pension saving rather than cash wages. The pri-
vate pension system-this two-plus-trillion-dollar
savings scheme-is tax driven.
C. Annuitization Eliminates Succession
From the standpoint of our interest in the patterns
of family wealth transmission, what is especially
important about the pension system is that it has
been deliberately designed to promote lifetime
exhaustion of the accumulated capital. The same
body of federal law that encourages pension saving
also tries to ensure that pension wealth will be con-
sumed over the lives of the worker and his spouse. I
do not mean to say that the federal policy in favor of
lifetime consumption of retirement savings cannot
be defeated for particular clients using appropriately
designed plans; indeed, that is one of the major ave-
nues of tax and estate planning for the carriage trade
that has arisen with the pension system. On the
32. See generally Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified
Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Real-
ity, 70 Virginia L. Rev. 419 (1984).
33. Private pension coverage is strongly skewed to employees
in the higher tax brackets. Whereas in 1983 only 24.3 percent of
persons earning under $5,000 per year had pension coverage,
84.9 percent earning more than $50,000 were covered. E.
Andrews, The Changing Profile of Pensions in America 52
(1985). For an account of why the antidiscrimination norm of
federal tax policy fails to achieve breadth of coverage, see Wolk,
supra note 32.
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other hand, most of the room for maneuver lies in
the area of defined contribution plans, whereas most
of the pension money (especially the middle class
money) is in defined benefit plans. My point is sim-
ply that, in the main, the federal policy to promote
consumption of pension wealth achieves its goal, and
only a negligible fraction of pension wealth finds its
way into intergenerational transfer.
The mechanism by which pension wealth is con-
sumed is annuitization. Just as life insurance is
insurance against dying too soon, annuitization
insures against living too long. Annuitization allows
people to consume their capital safely, that is, with-
out fear of running out of capital while still alive.
Annuitization requires a large pool of lives, which
is achieved by various methods of aggregating the
pension savings of many workers. Sometimes the
employer runs the pool, sometimes an intermediary
such as an insurance company or (for multiemployer
plans) a labor union. Annuitization requires assets
that can be liquidated predictably as distribution
requires. That is a trait characteristic of marketable
securities-that is, of the new property in financial
assets. Annuitization is wonderfully effective in
allowing a person to consume capital without fear of
outliving his capital, but the corollary is also mani-
fest: accounts that have been annuitized disappear
on the deaths of the annuitants. Not so much as a
farthing remains for the heirs. 1
From this brief tour of the private pension system,
I hope it will be clear why I place this topic alongside
my other main topic, wealth transfer by means of
investment in human capital, as the two central
chapters in what I have been calling the twentieth-
century revolution in family wealth transmission.
Both are developments of enormous magnitude, and
both lead away from traditional wealth transfer on
death. Propertied parents used to live from their pat-
rimony in farm or firm and then transmit the patri-
mony at death. Modern parents tend to possess
nontransmissible human capital rather more than
older forms of property. Using their human capital
to create lifetime income streams, modern parents
now undertake two cycles of saving and dissaving,
one for the children's education, the other for retire-
ment. The investment in the children necessarily
34. Unless the plan offers and the participants elect a mode of
annuitization that provides a guaranteed income stream (typi-
cally 10 or 20 years); in such cases, successors take the remain-
der of the stream if the annuitants die within the period.
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occurs in the parents' lifetimes. And especially when
the retirement saving program is channelled through
the enticing format of the qualified pension plan, the
pressures for annuitization cause this enormous
component of modern family wealth to be largely
exhausted upon the parents' deaths. Transfer on
death, the fundamental pattern of former times, is,
therefore, ceasing to characterize the dominant
wealth holding and wealth transmission practices of
the broad middle classes.
IV. WEALTH TRANSFER ON DEATH
A. The Carriage Trade
The trust-and-estate bar survives, and the main
reason is the carriage trade. As I said at the outset of
this article, the revolution in family wealth transmis-
sion stops short of really substantial accumulations
of wealth. The carriage trade remains to be served,
and it is hugely important. One study of data for the
half century from the early 1920s through the late
1960s focused on the top half of the top one percent
of wealth holders. Throughout the period the share
of national wealth held within this tiny cohort was
consistently above 20 percent." A different study
reckons that as of 1983, the top 840,000 households
each possessed wealth amounting to $1.4 million or
more. According to computations that originated in
Democratic Party policy circles and whose accuracy
has been questioned, this group of households
accounted for 42 percent of the country's net
wealth. 6 These calculations presuppose that finan-
cial instruments, business interests, and real prop-
erty are the only important components of wealth.
Because this way of measuring wealth excludes the
capitalized value of the income streams generated by
human capital, and because it excludes the capita-
lized value of private-pension and Social Security
income streams, it materially overstates the disparity
between the top wealth holders and the rest of the
populace. These calculations also overlook what
35. Smith & Franklin, The Concentration of Personal
Wealth: 1922-1969, 64 Amer. Econ Rev. (Proceedings) 162, 163
(1974).
36. Democratic Staff, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Con-
gress, The Concentration of Wealth in the United States:
Trends in the Distribution of Wealth among American Families
23-26 (1986). For skepticism about this computation, see J.
Thomas Eubank, A.D. 2001: Estate Planning in the Future, in
Twenty-first Annual Philip E. Heckerling Institute on Estate
Planning, ch. 20, at 20-4 to 20-11 (J. Gaubatz ed. 1987).
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economists call the life-cycle effect: A law student
who will have a six-figure income within a decade
can be reckoned currently as a pauper. Nevertheless,
the underlying point is undeniable. The top sliver of
wealth holders is indeed very affluent, and among
these people the need for estate planning services will
continue unabated.
To be sure, the transformation in the nature of
property has also affected great wealth-holders. The
family enterprise is less common, the portfolio of
financial assets is vastly more prevalent. But the
changes in the patterns of wealth transfer that I have
been describing for the middle and upper-middle
classes are much less important for the very well-to-
do. As regards the investment in human capital that
preoccupies the middle classes, I have already made
the point that because the amount of educational
investment that can be made in any one set of chil-
dren is constrained, the educational expenditures
that loom so large for conventionally propertied fam-
ilies constitute for dynastic wealth holders a much
smaller drain on family wealth.
Likewise, the qualified pension-plan account is
not an acceptable vehicle for great fortunes. Only
earned income, not investment income, is eligible for
qualified-plan tax deferral. Furthermore, section
415 of the Internal Revenue Code sets ceilings on the
amount of saving that anyone is allowed to do within
a qualified-plan account. Currently, the ceiling is
$30,000 per year in saving for defined contribution
plans; for defined benefit plans, the cap applies
when the annual benefit reaches $90,000 per year.
For people of middle-class and even upper-middle-
class means, these ceilings scarcely pinch, but for the
really well-to-do, such ceilings represent a significant
barrier. The simple truth is that dynastic wealth can-
not be stuffed into a pension account.
B. The Middle Classes
Turning to the middle and upper-middle classes,
we can identify a variety of factors that explain why
the trust-and-estate lawyer survives even where he
can no longer thrive. The personal circumstances of
some propertied decedents fall outside the prototype
that I have described-they are childless, for exam-
ple, or their employers did not offer much opportu-
nity for pension saving. But even people who fully
experience the two cycles of saving and dissaving
that I have described will have additional property
outside the pension accounts. This wealth is likely to
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comprise both financial assets and real estate, espe-
cially residential real estate (although much of the
real estate is likely to be held in probate-avoiding
forms of concurrent ownership). As of 1983, residen-
tial realty accounted for about 30 percent of the gross
wealth of American families. Data from 1975 indi-
cates that over 70 percent of Americans aged
between sixty-three and sixty-nine owned their
homes; almost 80 percent of the elderly owned their
homes free of mortgage.37 I do not have good data on
the nonresidential wealth of the elderly, but I would
certainly stipulate that their aggregate holdings are
extensive.
Whether the relative affluence of the present gen-
eration of American elders is likely to be reproduced
in the future is a harder question. Americans who
came of age during and shortly after World War II
experienced unexampled prosperity. The generation
that won the war profited hugely from the fifteen-
year Pax Americana that endured roughly from
1952 to 1967. As the war-torn economies of Europe
and the Far East rebuilt, America's comparative
advantage declined, and our relative affluence has
declined apace. Furthermore, the generation that
benefited from the one-time windfall of postwar
prosperity also received. the one-time windfall of the
huge increase in Social Security transfer payments.
It is worth remembering that as late as 1950, the
average monthly Social Security benefit for a retiree
was only $29.03. In 1987, that benefit was $491.75.
The present generation of elderly voted itself a
multi-trillion-dollar treat in the form of transfer pay-
ments extracted from succeeding generations.38 We
should not be surprised that some of these people
have some wealth left over to transmit at death.
C. The Nonprobate System
Quite apart from whether future generations of
elderly will be able to accumulate as much wealth as
the present generation, it is important to recognize
that much of the nonpension wealth that survives for
37. A. Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions 27
(1982) (citing Social Security Administration data).
38. See Lawrence Kotlikoff, Deficit Delusion, The Public
Interest 53, 62 (Summer 1986), describing Social Security as "a
Ponzi scheme," because "the first generation receives benefits
without having to finance the retirement of its immediate pred-
ecessors.... In contrast, middle-income household heads in the
cohort to be born in 1990 are projected over their lifetimes to
lose, on net, roughly $60,000 in present value as a consequence
of participating in Social Security."
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transfer on death in middle- and upper-middle class
families is deeply affected by another great trend that
has fundamentally diminished the lawyerly role in
transfer on death for persons of moderate means. I
refer to the explosive growth in the use of nonprobate
modes of transfer. Residential real estate is widely
held in joint tenancy, under which a death certificate
suffices to clear title without probate or court pro-
ceedings. The more interesting phenomenon is the
rise of the mass will substitutes that employ noncourt
transfer systems-life insurance, pension accumula-
tions prior to annuitization, POD accounts, joint
accounts, and so forth. The numbers for life insur-
ance alone are staggering: In 1986, American insur-
ers had $6.72 trillion of insurance in force, averaging
$81,200 per insured family; payments on death in
that year amounted to $19.5 billion. 9
The financial intermediaries who administer the
new paper property (especially insurance companies
and banks, but also investment companies, broker-
age houses, stock transfer agents, and many others)
have taken to offering transfer-on-death services
because they have a comparative advantage in doing
so. "Financial intermediation is, as the term signi-
fies, instrinsically administrative. Administrators
intermediate between savers and borrowers, between
passive owners and active users of capital. Pooling
wealth and servicing the resulting liabilities involves
recurrent transactions and communications. Once a
bureaucracy appropriate to such tasks is in opera-
tion, only a scant adaptation is necessary to extend
its functions and procedures to include the transfer
of account balances on death." Thus, the main
financial intermediaries have become powerful free-
market competitors, competing against the probate
system in arranging for wealth transfer on death.
The nonprobate system takes on a heightened sig-
nificance when viewed from the perspective of the
themes that I have been developing in this article.
Even when middle-class or upper-middle-class peo-
ple emerge from their two cycles of saving and dis-
saving in possession of other wealth, and even when
they hold that wealth until death, much of it-
indeed most of it-now passes to survivors with little
or no need for lawyer-administered transfer-on-
death services. I do not mean to imply that lay per-
sons are well advised to do their own estate planning
through the medium of the nonprobate system.
39. American Council of Life Insurance, 1987 Life Insurance
Fact Book Update 4 (1987).
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Quite to the contrary, I think that one of the worst
consequences of the nonprobate system is that it
tempts people into the mistake of thinking that
avoiding probate is the equivalent of estate planning.
Lay persons rarely understand the range of con-
tingencies that can arise in the wealth transfer pro-
cess-for example, issues such as lapse; and the
nonprobate system often handles those contingencies
less well than the probate process.
Nonprobate property is, of course, still subject to
the federal transfer taxes, but the drastic 1981 reduc-
tion in those taxes has diminished the demand for
estate planning services among the middle and
upper middle classes.
Apace with the decline in demand for lawyer-
assisted planning services is the diminution of
demand for lawyer-assisted transfer services even
when probate or administration of an estate must
occur. The probate reform movement of the 1960s,
epitomized in the Uniform Probate Code's provi-
sions for simplified probate and for nonadministra-
tion of very small estates,4 0 has further reduced the
need for court-operated transfer services.4 1
A comprehensive account of the patterns by which
inter vivos wealth transfers now displace transfers
that in former times occurred on death would also
embrace the huge twentieth-century increase in the
divorce rate. Dissolution upon divorce has replaced
dissolution upon death as the predominant mode of
terminating a marriage.42 The property transfers
40. Uniform Probate Code 3-301 and following, 3-1201 to 3-
1204, 8 U.L.A. 245, 412-16 (1982).
41. In a five-state study conducted under the auspices of the
American Bar Foundation in the mid-1970s, it was found that
"the average percentage of decedents' estates that underwent
estate administration ranged from (a low of] twenty percent in
California to [a high of] thirty-four percent in Massachusetts
..... "Stein & Fierstein, The Demography of Probate Adminis-
tration, 15 U. Baltimore L. Rev. 54, 61 (1985). Earlier data of
this sort is conveniently collected in Fletcher, Probate in Eng-
land, A Blueprint for the Future (book review), 46 Wash. L.
Rev. 619, 624-25 n.14 (1971). Most administered estates are
small, and most are now processed through the simplified
administration schemes. Simplified probate and administration
procedures significantly reduce the percentage of estates requir-
ing full-dress administration. Stein & Fierstein, supra at 75-77.
As the ABF study concluded, "relatively few decedents leave a
substantial estate requiring judicial administration." Id. at 87.
42. The official comment to the Uniform Marital Property
Act reports that, of marriages terminated in 1979, 42.77 percent
were terminated by death, compared to 57.23 percent that
ended in divorce. Uniform Marital Property Act, prefatory note
(1983).
29
that divorce precipitates, both transfers to spouses
and transfers to children, supplant in some measure
a wealth transfer process that used to occur through
succession.
Increasingly, I think, estate planning services for
the middle and upper-middle classes have the quality
of contingency planning. The client is motivated
largely by concern to make arrangements for his
family in the unlikely event that he should die pre-
maturely. He does not expect property actually to
pass under the instrument he executes. In this sense,
he views his estate plan somewhat like his term life
insurance policy. It is catastrophe insurance, worth
having even though it is unlikely to be needed.
V. CONCLUSION
I am more confident in studying the past than in
predicting the future, but I am confident in insisting
that the underlying forces that have transformed
family wealth transmission over the last century will
not abate. The modern expectation is that for
middle-class wealth, the main intergenerational
transfer will occur in mid-life, in the form of educa-
tional expenditures. The characteristic wealth of
later years, the income streams from the public and
private pension systems, do not give rise to heirship.
Thus, wealth transfer on death is ever less important
to the middle classes. When it does occur, it is ever
more likely to be channelled through the nonprobate
system.
Thanks to the carriage trade, the trust-and-estate
bar will not go the way of the blacksmith, but the
precipitous decline of the middle-class market is
likely to continue. The days of routine, lawyer-
guided wealth-transfer-on-death for the middle
classes have largely passed.
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